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A multi-sectoral partial equilibrium model of the markets for two types of Australian 
grapes and wine (premium and non-premium) is developed to study the aggregate 
returns from different types of research and promotion investments by the industry 
and their distribution across actors in the market (grapegrowers, winemakers, 
wholesalers/retailers, domestic consumers, the tax office and foreign consumers). 
The distinction is made between premium and non-premium, since half the market is 
non-premium and yet virtually all the R&D and marketing efforts are focused on just 
premium products in an attempt to raise quality as consumers continue to move up-
market. The results show that most of the gains from cost-reducing R&D go to 
producers, with wineries faring better than grapegrowers; that producers get a far 
larger share of the benefit from promotion when it is targeted abroad than when it 
focuses on domestic consumers; and that foreign consumers of Australian wine 
enjoy a small share of the benefits. 
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During the latter half of the 20
th century the wine industry in many parts of the world 
has gradually become more professional in its approach to investing both in research 
and development (R&D) and in promotion. This has been particularly pronounced in 
the New World as the industry has corporatized and large firms have emerged,
1 and as 
export-oriented output has expanded.
2 Brand-level promotion can be and is 
undertaken by large firms, but since the vast majority of firms are tiny, even in the 
United States and Australia, many cannot afford mass media promotion campaigns. 
They therefore depend on generic promotion of their nation and region of origin. With 
respect to R&D, even large firms, let alone small ones, cannot on their own justify 
undertaking much large-scale research. As well, the public-good nature of both 
research and generic promotion is such that they are underinvested in unless done 
collectively. Hence grapegrowers and winemakers in countries such as Australia 
agree to pay a production-based annual levy to fund both of those activities. The 
Australian Government supplements those funds, matching them in the case of R&D 
on a dollar-for-dollar basis up to 0.5 per cent of the value of production (Brennan and 
Mullen 2002).  
 
Who benefits from the investment of those funds? Does the distribution of benefits 
from R&D differ from that for promotion? To what extent do premium producers 
benefit relative to producers of lower-quality product? How do these outcomes 
change as the industry become more export-oriented? This paper outlines a 
methodology for addressing those questions. It then applies the model to Australian 
grape and wine industry data. The Australian case study is particularly timely at the 
moment for two reasons: because producers are contemplating raising the R&D levy 
they pay so as to at least reach the Federal Government’s 0.5% matching funding 
threshold; and because the industry has recently launched a major new marketing 
drive (WFA and AWBC 2000). As recent modelling results demonstrate (Anderson 
2001; Anderson, Norman and Wittwer 2001), the latter is going to be essential if 
producer prices are not to decline over the next few years as the recent boom in 
                                                 
1 The shares of national wine production held by the top five firms in 2000 are as follows: Australia 
68%, New Zealand 80%, United States 73%, Argentina 50%, and Chile 47%. By contrast, they are 
much lower in the Old World where small cooperatives still dominate: 13% in France (excluding 
Champagne), 10% in Spain and 5% in Italy (Anderson, Norman and Wittwer 2001). 
2 Between 1988 and 1999 wine production grew at 5.3 % per year in Australia, 2.8% in the United 
States, 2.4% in Chile and Uruguay, and 2.0% in New Zealand; and the share of global wine production 
that is exported rose from 15% to 25% (Anderson and Norman 2001, Tables 11 and 32).  6
plantings translates into ever-greater supplies of premium wines on the international 
market. 
 
Specifically, R&D via Australia’s Grape and Wine Research and Development 
Corporation (GWRDC) is currently funded by a levy of $5 per tonne of grapes ($2 per 
tonne from grapegrowers on grapes received by wineries, and $3 per tonne from 
wineries on the weight of grapes crushed for wine), which is matched by a similar 
grant from the Federal Government. As can be seen from Figure 1, there has been a 
significant increase in real dollar terms in the grape and wine R&D expenditure since 
early 1980s as a result of industry expansion and past increases in the levy rate. The 
annual R&D expenditure for 2000-01 reached $11.3 million in nominal terms. 
However, the producer proportion of that represents only about 0.3% of the value of 
production, well below the 0.5% limit to which matching government funding applies. 
Proposals are currently being considered by producers to raise the industry R&D levy 
and possibly to move to an ad valorem levy system so as to ensure funding moves 
with the product price as quality rises over time and/or supply growth depresses some 
prices. The support for such a rise has been boosted by a recent benefit-cost study 
suggesting that the current portfolio of GWRDC research projects is expected to yield 
a 9:1 benefit/cost ratio and that a sample of past projects yielded ratios ranging from 
7:1 to 76:1 (McLeod 2002). 
 
Generic national promotion abroad is funded by a Federal Government grant plus a 
compulsory wine export levy based on the f.o.b. value of wine exported (0.2% of an 
exporter’s first $10 million of sales, 0.1% for the next $40 million, and 0.05% for 
sales beyond $50 million per year). The manager of those funds is the Australian 
Wine and Brandy Corporation (AWBC). Generic regional promotion is funded by 
voluntary membership of regional associations. State governments have supplemented 
the federal contributions from time to time (GWRDC 2001; AWBC 2001; Brennan 
and Mullen 2001). 
 
The two producer groups and the government (on behalf of taxpayers and domestic 
consumers) are interested in maximizing the pay-offs from the investment for those 
funds. The government is also concerned about any spillovers to other producer 
groups, and any additional environmental and/or social outcomes generated from the  7
expenditure of those public funds. There is also the issue of how much of the research 
outcome benefits wine consumers and producers in other countries, both gross and net 
of benefits to Australia from similar activities abroad.  
 
Issues of interest include, among others, the returns from research investments versus 
those from promotion, the returns from cost-reducing R&D for grapes versus for wine 
versus quality-enhancing R&D, and returns from domestic promotion versus those 
from export promotion. Both the aggregate benefit/cost ratios of these broad types of 
investments, and the distribution of total returns among groups such as premium and 
non-premium grape growers, premium and non-premium winemakers, domestic 
retailers, taxpayers, and domestic and overseas consumers are of interest. The 
distributional issue relates to the question of who should pay for what types of 
investments: not only as between consumers (including as taxpayers) and producers, 
but also as between grape growers and wineries (given that much of the quality of a 
wine is determined in the vineyard prior to crushing). In addition, the impact on the 
government treasury via both the wholesale sales tax (now called a Wine Equalization 
Tax (WET)) and the Goods and Services Tax (GST) will also be informative.  
 
The returns from the various parts of this investment portfolio need to be analysed 
within a comprehensive, internally consistent framework. Just measuring the direct 
effect of, say, a new cost-reducing viticultural technology on grape growers’ costs per 
tonne is insufficient, for it does not take into account the indirect flow-on effects to 
those further down the supply chain and the associated changes in prices and 
quantities. Determining the net economic welfare benefits for growers, winemakers 
and consumers requires an economic model that identifies explicitly the multi-stage 
production process involved.
3 Even that leaves unmeasured any economic spillovers 
to other Australian industries or the grape and wine industries of other countries, and 
any social and environmental spillovers (both positive and negative).  
 
There is a rapidly growing literature on the economic evaluation of research and 
promotion expenditures (see Alston, Norton and Pardey 1995). A common approach 
                                                 
3 The global average cost of a bottle of wine is shared roughly as follows: 10% to the grapegrower, 
30% to the winery, 37% to transporters, wholesalers and retailers, and 23% to tax collectors (Wittwer, 
Berger and Anderson 2002).  8
has been the use of a partial equilibrium, comparative static framework to measure 
effects on economic welfare within an industry or sector (Freebairn, Davis and 
Edwards 1982; Wohlgenant 1993; Alston and Chalfant (1999); Zhao et al. 2000). A 
set of demand and supply equations with general functional form are used to describe 
the relationships among various industry links in the supply chain and consumer 
groups (see, for example, Alston and Wohgenant 1990; Zhao, Mullen and Griffith 
1997). The impacts of alternative R&D and promotion investments are modelled as 
exogenous variables that shift the relevant supply or demand curves, and the changes 
in prices and quantities resulting from new technologies or promotion are then 
obtained to estimate the welfare implications for various industry groups. 
 
In this paper, we use a multi-sectoral partial equilibrium model of the markets for two 
types of Australian grapes and wine (premium and non-premium) to study the 
aggregate returns and their distributions from different types of research and 
promotion investments in the industry. The distinction between premium and non-
premium is crucial, since half the market is non-premium and yet virtually all the 
R&D and marketing efforts are focused on just premium products in an attempt to 
raise quality as consumers continue to move up-market. The model is presented first, 
and the data and market parameters are described next. Results are then presented, 




The structure of the model of the Australian wine industry is provided in Figure 1, 
where each rectangle represents a production function and each arrowed straight line 
the market for a product, with the arrowed end being the demand and the non-arrowed 
end being the supply of the product. Each oval represents a supply or demand 
schedule where an exogenous shift may occur.  
 
Horizontally, the industry is disaggregated into premium and non-premium wine 
sectors. Vertically, the industry is separated into the following sectors: grape 
production, wine making, wine marketing and final consumption. This enables us to 
study implications of R&D and promotion investments in individual parts of the wine 
production and marketing chain.  9
 
We assume that participants in all sectors are profit-maximizers and the technologies 
are characterised by constant returns to scale. The economic equilibrium among 
sectors of the Australian wine industry can be modelled with general functional forms 
by Equations (1)-(36). Fifteen exogenous shifter variables are incorporated in the 
model. Variable notation is also shown in Figure 2.  
 
Input supply to the premium and non-premium wine sectors: 
 
(1)   Xp = Xp(wp, wmp, TXp, TXmp)   Supply of premium grapes 
 
(2) Xp = Xp1 + Xnp1     Destinations for premium grapes 
 
(3) Xp2 = Xp2(wp2, TXp2)   Supply of premium wine specific inputs 
 
(4) Xp3 = Xp3(wp3, TXp3)   Supply of other premium winemaking inputs 
 
Equation (1) is the supply function for premium wine grapes, relating total quantity 
supplied Xp to own price wp and the price of multi-purpose grapes wmp. In other 
words, it is assumed that the premium grape growers can shift some of the production 
to multi-purpose grapes, through grafting for example, in response to changes in the 
relative prices of the two types of grapes. TXp and TXmp are the supply shifters 
representing the impacts of new technologies that reduce the costs of producing 
premium and non-premium grapes respectively.  The identity given in Equation (2) 
shows that the premium grapes can be used for producing either premium wine (Xp1) 
or non-premium wine (Xnp1). Less than 5% of premium grapes are used for non-
premium wine production. Equations (3) and (4) are supply functions for two other 
aggregated inputs to premium wine production. Xp2 represents fixed capital, human 
capital and other inputs that are specific to premium wine making.  These are 
relatively inelasticly supplied. Xp3 represents mobile factors such as labour, chemical 
and other factor inputs that are non-specific to premium wine making. Supplies of 
these inputs are elastic. TXp2 and TXp3 are supply shifters for Xp2 and Xp3 respectively. 
Xp2 can be used to represent technical changes in the premium wine making sector. 
   
(5)   Xmp = Xmp(wmp, wp, TXp, TXmp)   Supply of multipurpose grapes 
 
(6) Xmp = Xnp2 + Xdtd + Xdte         Destinations for multipurpose grapes 
 
(7) Xnp3 = Xnp3(wnp3, TXnp3)         Supply of non-premium wine specific inputs  10
 
(8) Xnp4 = Xnp4(wnp4, TXnp4)         Supply of other non-premium wine making inputs 
 
Equation (5) is the supply of multi-purpose grapes relating the quantity supplied to 
own price and the price of premium grapes, with TXp and TXmp as the supply shifters.  
Equation (6) shows that multi-purpose grapes can be used either for non-premium 
wine production (32%) or as dried and table grapes for domestic or export market. 
Equations (7) and (8) are supply functions for capital inputs (Xnp3) and mobile inputs 
(Xnp4) respectively into non-premium wine production, with TXnp3 and TXnp4 as supply 
shifters.  
 
Demand for table grapes 
 
(9)   Xdtd = Xdtd(wmp, NXdtd)  domestic demand for drying/table grapes 
 
(10)   Xdte = Xdte(wmp, NXdte)   overseas demand for drying table grapes 
 
Equations (9) and (10) are demand schedules for dried and table grapes for domestic 
(Xdtd) and export (Xdte) markets respectively. NXdtd and NXdte are the respective 
demand shifters. 
 
Output-constrained input demand of the premium wine sector 
 
(11)   Xp1 = Yp* c′Yp,1(wp, wp2, wp3)   demand for premium grapes 
 
(12)   Xp2 = Yp* c′Yp,2(wp, wp2, wp3)   demand for specific inputs  
 
(13)   Xp3 = Yp* c′Yp,3(wp, wp2, wp3)   demand for other inputs  
 
The above three equations are the output-constrained input demand for Xp1, Xp2 and 
Xp3, derived using Shephard’s Lemma. c′Yp,i(wp, wp2, wp3) (i=1, 2, 3) are partial 
derivatives of the unit cost functions cYp(wp, wp2, wp3) (i=1, 2, 3).  
 
Output-constrained input demand of the non-premium wine sector 
 
(14)   Xnp1 = Ynp* c′Ynp,1(wp, wmp, wnp3, wnp4)      demand for premium grapes 
 
(15)   Xnp2 = Ynp* c′Ynp,2(wp, wmp, wnp3, wnp4)  demand for non- premium grapes
    
(16)   Xnp3 = Ynp* c′Ynp,3(wp, wmp, wnp3, wnp4)   demand for specific inputs 
 
(17)   Xnp4 = Ynp* c′Ynp,4(wp, wmp, wnp3, wnp4)   demand for other inputs  
  11
Equations (14)-(17) are the output-constrained input demand for non-premium wine 
production, also derived using Shephard’s Lemma. c′Ynp,i(wp, wmp, wnp3, wnp4) (i=1, 
…, 4) are partial derivatives of the unit cost functions cYnp(wp, wmp, wnp3, wnp4) (i=1, 
…, 4).  
 
Market-clearing condition/supply of premium and non-premium wholesale wine: 
 
(18)   vp = cYp(wp, wp2, wp3)           supply of  premium wine 
 
(19)   vnp = cYnp(wp, wmp, wnp3, wnp4)  supply of  non- premium wine   
 
The above market-clearing conditions specify that unit price for the output equals the 
unit cost of the production. 
 
Destination of wine at the cellar door: 
 
(20)   Yp = Ypd1 + Ype1            premium wine destinations 
 
(21)   Ynp = Ynpd1 + Ynpe            non-premium wine destinations 
 
Equations (20) and (21) show that both premium and non-premium producer wines 
are destined for either domestic and export markets. 
 
Supply of wine marketing inputs: 
 
(22)   Ypd2 = Ypd2 (vpd2, TYpd2)      supply of  domestic premium wine marketing inputs 
 
(23)   Ype2 = Ype2 (vpe2, TYpe2)   supply of  export premium wine marketing inputs 
 
(24)   Ynpd2 = Ynpd2 (vnpd2, TYnpd2)      supply of domestic non-premium wine marketing inputs 
 
Equations (22)-(24) show that the supplies of marketing inputs (Ypd2, Ype2 and Ynpd2) 
relate to own prices (vpd2, vpe2 and vnpd2), with impacts of marketing R&D represented 
by the shifters (TYpd2, TYpe2 and TYnpd2). 
    
Output-constrained input demand of the wine marketing sectors: 
 
(25)   Ypd1 = Qpd* c′Qpd,1(vp, vpd2)   for premium wine -- domestic 
 
(26)   Ypd2 = Qpd* c′Qpd,2(vp, vpd2)     for premium wine marketing inputs – domestic 
 
(27)   Ype1 = Qpe* c′Qpe,1(vp, vpe2)   for premium wine -- export 
 
(28)   Ype2 = Qpe* c′Qpe,2(vp, vpe2)      for premium wine marketing inputs – export  12
 
(29)   Ynpd1 = Qnpd* c′Qnpd,1(vnp, vnpd2)    for non-premium wine -- domestic 
 
(30)   Ynpd2 = Qnpd* c′Qnpd,2(vnp, vnpd2)  for non-premium wine marketing inputs -- domestic   
 
These are the output-constrained input demand for the three marketing sectors from 
Shephard’s Lemma.  
 
Market-clearing condition for the marketing sectors:  
 
(31)   ppd = c(vp, vpd2)          premium wine domestic marketing 
 
(32)   ppe = c(vp, vpe2)   premium wine export marketing  
 
(33) pnpd = c(vnp, vnpd2)             non-premium wine domestic marketing 
 
These specify that unit output price for each of the three marketing sectors is equal to 
the unit cost function. 
    
Final demand for wine:  
 
(34)   Ynpe = Ynpe(vnp, NYnpe)   overseas demand for non-premium wine 
 
(35)   Qpd = Qpd(ppd, pnpd, NQpd, NQnpd)      domestic demand for premium wine  
 
(36)   Qpe = Qpe(ppe, NQpe)            overseas  demand for premium wine  
 
(37)   Qnpd = Qnpd (ppd, pnpd, NQpd, NQnpd)   domestic demand for non-premium wine  
 
These are the demand functions for the four final wine products/markets. The N’s are 
demand shifters representing impacts of promotion or increase in product quality in 
individual markets. As can be seen from Equations (35) and (37), the premium and 
non-premium wines are assumed substitutes in the domestic market. 
 
The above structural model defines an equilibrium status in all markets involved. 
When a new technology or promotion disturbs the system through an exogenous 
shock, a displacement from the base equilibrium results. By totally differentiating the 
system of equations at the initial equilibrium points, the displacement model that 
relates changes of endogenous variables to changes in exogenous shifters can be 
derived as follows, where E(.)=∆(.)/(.) represents a small relative change of a variable 
(.). Definitions of all market parameters are given in Table 1.  They refer to values at  13
the initial equilibrium points. Integrability conditions such as symmetry and 
homogeneity conditions are imposed implicitly. 
 
The model in equilibrium displacement format 
 
Input supply to premium wine and non-premium wine sectors: 
 
(1)’   EXp = ε(Xp, wp)(Ewp - tXp) + ε(Xp, wmp)(Ewmp - tXmp)  Supply of premium grapes 
 
(2)’ EXp = ρXp1EXp1 + ρXnp1EXnp1   Destinations for premium grapes 
 
where ρXp1=Xp1/( Xp1+Xnp1) and ρXnp1=Xp1/( Xp1+Xnp1) are quantity shares.  
 
 
(3)’ EXp2 = ε(Xp2, wp2)(Ewp2 - tXp2)   Supply of premium wine specific inputs 
 
(4)’ EXp3 = ε(Xp3, wp3)(Ewp3 - tXp3)     Supply of other premium wine making inputs 
 
(5)’   EXmp = ε(Xmp, wmp)(Ewmp - tXmp) +ε(Xmp, wp)(Ewp - tXp) Supply of multipurpose grapes 
 
(6)’ EXmp = ρnp2E Xnp2 + ρXdtdEXdtd + ρXdteEXdte    Destinations for multipurpose grapes 
 
where ρXnp2=Xnp2/(Xnp2+Xdt) and ρXdt=Xdt/(Xnp2+Xdt) are quantity shares. 
 
 
(7)’ EXnp3 = ε(Xnp3, wnp3)(Ewnp3 - tXnp3)   Supply of non-premium wine specific inputs 
 
(8)’ EXnp4 = ε(Xnp4, wnp4)(Ewnp4 - tXnp4)   Supply of other non-premium wine making inputs 
 
Demand for drying and table grapes: 
 
(9)’   EXdtd = η(Xdtd, wmp)(Ewmp - nXdtd)  domestic demand for drying/table grapes 
 
(10)’   EXdte = η(Xdte, wdte)(Ewmp - nXdte)  overseas demand for drying/table grapes 
 
 
Output-constrained input demand of the premium wine sector: 
 
(11)’   EXp1 = -(κp2σ(Xp1, Xp2) + κp3σ(Xp1, Xp3)) Ewp + κp2σ(Xp1, Xp2)Ewp2  
+ κp3σ(Xp1, Xp3)Ewp3 + EYp         demand for premium grapes 
 
(12)’   EXp2 = κp1σ(Xp1, Xp2)Ewp - (κp1σ(Xp1, Xp2) + κp3σ(Xp2, Xp3)) Ewp2  
+ κp3σ(Xp2, Xp3)Ewp3 + EYp    demand for specific inputs  
 
(13)’   EXp3 = κp1σ(Xp1, Xp3)Ewp + κp2σ(Xp2, Xp3)Ewp2  
- (κp1σ(Xp1, Xp3) + κp2σ(Xp2, Xp3))Ewp3 + EYp      demand for other inputs  14
 
Output-constrained input demand of the non-premium wine sector: 
 
(14)’   EXnp1 = -(κnp2σ(Xnp1, Xnp2)+κnp3σ(Xnp1, Xnp3)+κnp4σ(Xnp1, Xnp4))Ewp  
+ κnp2σ(Xnp1, Xnp2)wmp + κnp3σ(Xnp1, Xnp3)Ewnp3 + κnp4σ(Xnp1, Xnp4)Ewnp4 + EYnp     
                    demand for premium grapes 
 
(15)’   EXnp2 = -(κnp1σ(Xnp1, Xnp2)+κnp3σ(Xnp2, Xnp3)+κnp4σ(Xnp2, Xnp4))Ewmp  
+ κnp1σ(Xnp1, Xnp2)wp + κnp3σ(Xnp2, Xnp3)Ewnp3 + κnp4σ(Xnp2, Xnp4)Ewnp4 + EYnp 
demand for non- premium grapes
    
(16)’   EXnp3 = -(κnp1σ(Xnp1, Xnp3)+κnp2σ(Xnp2, Xnp3)+κnp4σ(Xnp3, Xnp4))Ewnp3  
+ κnp1σ(Xnp1, Xnp3)wp + κnp2σ(Xnp2, Xnp3)Ewmp + κnp4σ(Xnp3, Xnp4)Ewnp4 + EYnp 
demand for specific inputs 
 
(17)’   EXnp4 = -(κnp1σ(Xnp1, Xnp4)+κnp2σ(Xnp2, Xnp4)+κnp3σ(Xnp3, Xnp4))Ewnp4  
+ κnp1σ(Xnp1, Xnp4)wp + κnp2σ(Xnp2, Xnp4)Ewmp + κnp3σ(Xnp3, Xnp4)Ewnp3 + EYnp 
demand for other inputs  
 
Market-clearing condition/supply of premium and non-premium wholesale wine: 
 
(18)’   Evp = κp1Ewp+ κp2Ewp2+ κp3Ewp3        supply of premium wine 
 
(19)’   Evnp = κnp1Ewp+ κnp2Ewmp+ κnp3Ewnp3+ κnp4Ewnp4  
supply of  non- premium wine   
 
Destination of wine at the cellar door: 
 
(20)’   EYp = θpdEYpd1 + θpeEYpe1          premium wine destinations 
 
(21)’   EYnp = θnpdEYnpd1 + θnpeEYnpe        non-premium wine destinations 
 
Supply of wine marketing inputs: 
 
(22)’   EYpd2 = ε(Ypd2, vpd2)(Evpd2 - tYpd2)   supply of  domestic premium wine marketing inputs 
 
(23)’   EYpe2 = ε(Ype2, vpe2)(Evpe2 - tYpe2)   supply of  export premium wine marketing inputs 
 
(24)’   EYnpd2 = ε(Ynpd2, vnpd2)(Evnpd2 - tYnpd2)  
supply of domestic non-premium wine marketing inputs 
 
Output-constrained input demand of the wine marketing sectors: 
 
(25)’   EYpd1 = -λpd2σ(Ypd1, Ypd2)Evp + λpd2σ(Ypd1, Ypd2)Evpd2 + EQpd    
for premium wine -- domestic 
(26)’   EYpd2 = λpd1σ(Ypd1, Ypd2)Evp - λpd1σ(Ypd1, Ypd2)Evpd2 + EQpd     
 for premium wine marketing inputs – domestic 
(27)’   EYpe1 = -λpe2σ(Ype1, Ype2)Evp + λpe2σ(Ype1, Ype2)Evpe2 + EQpe  
  for premium wine -- export  15
 
(28)’   EYpe2 = λpe1σ(Ype1, Ype2)Evp - λpe1σ(Ype1, Ype2)Evpe2 + EQpe 
    for premium wine marketing inputs – export 
 
(29)’   EYnpd1 = -λnpd2σ(Ynpd1, Ynpd2)Evnp + λnpd2σ(Ynpd1, Ynpd2)Evnpd2 + EQnpd  
    for non-premium wine -- domestic 
 
(30)’   EYnpd2 = λnpd1σ(Ynpd1, Ynpd2)Evnp - λnpd1σ(Ynpd1, Ynpd2)Evnpd2 + EQnpd 
for non-premium wine marketing inputs -- domestic   
  
Market-clearing condition for the marketing sectors:  
 
(31)’   Eppd = λpd1Evp + λpd2Evpd2        premium wine domestic marketing 
 
(32)’   Eppe = λpe1Evp + λpe2Evpe2   premium wine export marketing  
 
(33)’ Epnpd = λnpd1Evnp + λnpd2Evnpd2   non-premium wine domestic marketing 
       
 
Final demand for wine:  
 
(34)’   EYnpe = η(Ynpe, vnpe)(Evnp – nYnpe)  overseas demand for non-premium wine 
 
(35)’   EQpd = η(Qpd, ppd)(Eppd - nQpd)+η(Qpd, pnpd)(Epnpd - nQnpd)   domestic demand 
for premium wine  
 
(36)’   EQpe =  η(Qpe, ppe)(Eppe - nQpe)        overseas  demand for premium wine  
 
(37)’   EQnpd = η(Qnpd, ppd)(Eppd - nQpd)+η(Qnpd, pnpd)(Epnpd - nQnpd)  





The inputs required for the model in Equations (1)’-(36)’ are in three parts: (i) base 
equilibrium values for all sectors and markets that summarize the industry prior to the 
shocks to be considered; (ii) market parameters that describe producer and consumer 
responsiveness to any price changes, and (iii) the values of exogenous variables that 
quantify the effects of R&D and promotion. 
 
The database used for the base equilibrium for 1996 and 2005 is adapted from the 
model of global wine markets outlined in Anderson, Norman and Wittwer (2001) and 
Wittwer, Berger and Anderson (2002), which describe the sectoral disaggregation of 
the Australian wine industry as projected to 2005. As it often takes up to seven years 
before newly planted vines are fully bearing, the projection of production to 2005  16
based on planting areas up to 1999 is likely to be reasonably robust. The 
disaggregation between premium and non-premium wines is based on containers, 
with premium wines referring to those in bottles of 1.5 litres or less and non-premium 
otherwise.  
 
The input cost structures for industry sectors are adapted and reconstructed from the 
database in Wittwer, Berger and Anderson (2002). Inputs other than grapes to the two 
winemaking sectors are grouped into two aggregated inputs: capital inputs and mobile 
factors. The capital inputs refer to fixed capital, human capital and other inputs that 
are specific to wine making and that have relatively inelastic supplies. The mobile 
factor inputs include all other factors such as labour, chemicals and other mobile 
factors that are non-specific to the wine industry and that are more mobile. These 
therefore have relatively elastic supplies. The inputs to wine marketing sectors are 
grouped into wholesale wine inputs and other marketing inputs. The cost structures 
for marketing sectors are based in part on the margin information in Wittwer, Berger 
and Anderson (2002), as are the splits among domestic and export destinations for 
both premium and non-premium wines. The base values and the resulting cost shares 
are summarized in Table 1. We show them for both 2005 and, for comparative 
purposes, for 1996 before the recent dramatic increase in vine plantings. 
 
The market elasticity values used are given in Table 2.  On the supply side these relate 
to both a short-term (say two-year) and a longer-term (say seven-year) adjustment 
period, and are specified according to limited empirical studies and subjective 
judgement. On the demand side, in addition to including input substitution and own-
price elasticities, we include a cross-price elasticity of final demand between premium 
and non-premium wine for the domestic market. Sensitivity analysis to changes of 
these parameter values is helpful in determining the relative importance of improving 
on those estimates. 
 
There are fifteen exogenous variables in the model that can be used to shift the 
various demand and supply schedules and thus to model the impacts of various R&D 
and promotion investments on various industry sectors. In this study, we concentrate 
on estimating the impacts of five R&D and promotion scenarios:  
(1) Cost-reducing R&D in premium grape production (tXp=-1%);   17
(2) Cost-reducing R&D in premium wine making (tXp2=-1%);  
(3) Quality-enhancing R&D for premium wine (nQpd=1% and nQpe=1%);  
(4) premium wine promotion in the domestic market (nQpd=1%); and  
(5) premium wine promotion in the export market (nQpe=1%).  
 
In each case, a one per cent vertical parallel shift of the relevant supply or demand 
curve is assumed. In other words, we examine the impacts of a 1% cost reduction in 
the relevant sector in the case of cost-reducing R&D and a 1% increase in consumers’ 
willingness to pay due to promotion or product quality improvement.  
 
Results of the impacts of alternative R&D and promotion investments  
 
With specified values for the base equilibrium, market elasticities and exogenous 
shifters, the equilibrium displacement model in Equations (1)’-(37)’ can be solved to 
obtain the percentage changes in all price and quantity variables for each policy 
scenario. Changes in economic surpluses are then calculated for each of the industry 
groups involved. 
 
The economic welfare results for the five scenarios are summarised in Table 3 for the 
short run and in Table 4 for the longer run. For each case, total non-government 
economic welfare gains and wine tax revenue changes are shown in 2001 AUD 
(converted from 1999 $US millions, the unit of measurement in the model from which 
the data are drawn, simply by multiplying by 2). Table 3 and 4 provide the 
proportional distribution of the welfare effects of each shock among grapegrowers, 
wineries, retailers, domestic and overseas consumers. They also show the effects on 
the two types of tax revenues collected from industry (the recently introduced Wine 
Equalization Tax and the Goods and Services Tax – see Wittwer and Anderson (2002) 
for an analysis of those tax changes). In the interest of brevity the price and quantity 
changes for each scenario are not presented, but they are available from the authors. 
 
What do the results reveal, focusing on the 2005 projections (with the 1996 results 
being left until the end)? Consider the first column of Table 3. It shows how a 1% 
shift downwards in the premium grape supply curve because of productivity 
enhancing R&D would, in the short run, benefit mostly but not only premium  18
producers: 44% of the non-government economic welfare gain would go to the 
grapegrowers and 36% to the makers of premium wine, while most of the rest is 
shared with domestic and overseas consumers (7% and 8% respectively). The reason 
that some of the benefit goes to consumers is because, given the partial equilibrium 
setting, consumers enjoy a lower price and higher quantity as a result of lower 
production costs. The total gain is $13.8 million per year, less a $0.2 million loss in 
tax. This is roughly the budget of the Grape and Wine Research and Development 
Corporation for 2002-03. Wine tax revenue is reduced because the increased quantity 
cannot compensate the reduced price, due in part to the relatively low price elasticity 
of demand assumed, so the wholesale and retail values for wine are both reduced as a 
result of the cost reduction. In the longer term, as grapegrowers have more time to 
expand their plantings of premium grapes and reduce their planting of non-premium 
grapes in response to the new premium cost-reducing technologies, the net welfare 
gain is only slightly greater but a larger share of that benefit (almost one-third) goes to 
consumers at the expense of grapegrowers whose share falls from 44% to 35% -- yet 
the share to winemakers falls very little (compare column 1 in Tables 3 and 4). 
 
If instead the cost-reducing R&D is directed toward premium wine (rather than grape) 
production, the majority of the short-run welfare gains (57%) go to premium wineries 
and only 24% goes to grapegrowers, with again 15% going to consumers. The net 
benefit of that shock would be $21 million per year, of which 9% goes to consumers 
abroad.
4 This gain is greater than the short-run gain in the grape R&D scenario ($14 
million pa), even though it involved a similar 1% shock, because of the large 
additional value added in the supply chain by the winery. That 57% share of the gain 
to wineries is diminished over time and in the longer run scenario of Table 4 is only 
45%, with the consumers’ share rising from 15% to 24%, equalling the grapegrowers’ 
share which hardly changes over that adjustment period.  
 
If, as a result of quality-enhancing R&D anywhere along the chain of premium wine 
production, consumers are willing to pay more for a better Australian premium wine 
in both domestic and overseas markets, then grape producers (26%), wineries (39%) 
and domestic consumers (20%) all gain significant shares in the short run. This also  19
holds in the longer run in Table 4, with some of the benefits shifting from grape and 
wine producers to overseas consumers, whose share rises from 7% to 12% of the total 
$66 million per year gains. 
 
Turning to domestic promotion of premium wine (see the 4
th set of columns of Tables 
3 and 4), only about one-tenth of the gains from such promotion would accrue to 
producers and retailers About 90% of the welfare gains go to domestic consumers, in 
the sense that they are willing to pay more after the promotion.
5  
The final scenario is of particular interest to those engaged in the industry’s efforts to 
boost marketing abroad of Australian premium wine (WFA and AWBC 2001), since 
it shows the distributional effects of such an initiative. They are very different from 
the effects of R&D and domestic promotion. Specifically, in the short run 
grapegrowers gain half the benefits and premium winemakers gain more than half of 
the benefits. Non-premium producers, on the other hand, lose slightly from such 
promotion. Certainly overseas consumers benefit in the willingness-to-pay sense, 
enjoying 20% of the total measured welfare gain in the short run. These percentages 
add to more than 100 because domestic consumers lose substantially from the price-
raising effect of the promotion abroad, due to the reduced supply to the domestic 
market as more wine is going overseas. In the longer run (Table 4) the effects are 
similar but with somewhat more benefit/less loss to consumers and somewhat less 
benefit to both grapegrowers and winemakers. 
 
How do the above results for 2005 compare with what they would have been in 1996? 
The differences are minor in terms of the distributional shares, despite the fact that in 
2005, 70% of Australian premium wine is expected to be sold abroad whereas in 1996 
that share was only 49% (see the data in Table 1). However, when expressed in terms 
of dollars, the differences between 1996 and 2005 are huge, thanks to the dramatic 
growth of the industry’s plantings in the latter 1990s. For example, the aggregate 
estimated benefit from the same proportion of cost reduction in either grape or wine 
R&D in 1996 is only about two-fifths that of 2005, while the difference in the 
                                                                                                                                            
4 For simplicity we assume throughout that, in the time frame considered here, there are no beneficial 
spillovers to producers abroad in terms of the new technologies lowering their costs of production. 
5 Although see the important comments by Alston and Chalfant (1999) on the difficulties of inferring 
benefits to consumers from advertising.  20
aggregate benefit from the same promotional effort in export markets is even greater. 
Table 5 summarizes these actual dollar benefits to various industry groups, drawn 
from the first and final sets of columns in Table 4. 
 
It is interesting to compare our results for the wine industry to that of a similar study 
for the beef industry (Zhao 1999), not least because it indicates how sensitive the 
welfare distribution results are to assumed values of market elasticities and model 
specification. Both industries are significant exporters; have differentiated products; 
and involve a vertical chain of farm production, post-farm processing, marketing, and 
domestic and export consumption. Details of the comparison are in the Appendix. 
Post-farm processors and marketers in the case of beef are found to benefit little from 
R&D and promotion because that study assumed high price elasticities of supply for 
those sectors. As a result, most of the welfare gains go to domestic consumers. In 
addition, due to the assumption also of joint processing (a feature not in the wine 
industry), domestic consumers gain from overseas promotion. 
 
Implications and conclusions 
 
Numerous qualifications need to be kept in mind in interpreting the above results. 
Obviously the numbers depend heavily on the elasticities assumed (see Table 2). The 
comparison of the results in Table 3 with those in Table 4 provide a form of 
sensitivity analysis with respect to grape and wine supply elasticities. Systematic 
account for uncertainty in market parameters, as undertaken in Zhao et. al. (2000) and 
Griffiths and Zhao (2000), would add further insights. 
 
The study has also ignored the impacts of any costs incurred in R&D and promotion. 
Both generic R&D and promotion are funded in part by producer levies, which in 
effect add to the production costs and shift the supply curves upwards. It is assumed 
that the magnitude of such shifts are small in comparison to the shifts resulted from 
R&D-induced productivity gains and the increases in willingness-to-pay due to 
quality-enhancing R&D or generic promotion. This assumption is supported by the 
estimated high cost-benefit ratios in GWRDC research programs (McLeod 2002). 
                                                                                                                                            
6 Although see the important comments by Alston and Chalfant (1999) on the difficulties of inferring  21
Similarly, costs in developing and extending research outcomes are not considered. 
For example, in the case of implementing quality-enhancing technologies, there may 
be extra costs in switching to different vines or buying new equipments for wineries. 
The impact of such costs can be considered as upward shifts in the relevant supply 
curves in our model, and the burden of such costs will be redistributed along the 
industry chain in the same proportions as the distribution of benefits from cost-
reducing R&D, which are estimated in the first two columns of Table 3 and 4. 
 
It also should be kept in mind that this model only captures partial equilibrium effects 
within the Australian industry and for overseas consumers, leaving unmeasured any 
economic spillovers to other industries (including the grape and wine industry abroad) 
and any social and environmental spillovers (both positive and negative).  
 
As well, the economic surplus measure of consumer welfare is not without problems 
(see Just, Heuth and Schmitz 1982), particularly when used to measure gains from 
promotion (Alston and Chalfant 1999). The only sense in which it is used here is as a 
‘willingness-to-pay’ measure. 
 
It would seem, though, that the major direct gainers within the grape and wine 
industry from R&D will be producers, and more so as the industry becomes more and 
more export focused over the next decade. In addition, even though growers and 
winemakers contribute about 50% of the R&D funds in the form of statuary levies, 
they eventually off-load some of the burden to consumers through the incidence of 
levy, so their ‘real’ contribution/burden is less than 50%. Hence the justification for 
matching funding from the government for R&D will need to depend increasingly not 
just on the gains to domestic consumers but also on positive net spillovers to other 
sectors of the Australian economy, including through the value of the research to 
science generally. In the case of promotion abroad, the gains are even more 
concentrated on producers, with domestic consumers losing because of the price-
raising effect such promotion has on the home market. In that case, the justification 
for government subsidization depends on spillovers in the form of in-bound tourism 
and the like. 
                                                                                                                                            
benefits to consumers from advertising.  22
 
Finally, with the industry re-considering the R&D levy in the light of the apparently 
high rewards from research to date (McLeod 2002) and the fact that the current levy is 
well below the 0.5% threshold that attracts maximum government matching funds, 
now is the time to question the method of levying in addition to raising its level. To 
date it has been a weight-based gravimetric measure, and so has declined as a percent 
of the gross value of production over the past decade as the price of wine has risen 
with quality improvements and with increased demand in export markets. An easy 
way to prevent that continuing is to switch to a value-basedad valorem levy rate. That 
would have the additional effect of ensuring that higher-quality producers pay more 
per tonne. Since most of the promotion and much of the R&D is focused on premium 
rather than non-premium products, that would also seem a more equitable way to levy 
producers.   23
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Table 1(a): Base equilibrium values projected for 2005 (in 1999 $US million) 
Grapes 
 
Premium Grapes  
 
  Total value:      TVXp = 675 
  Destinations:    ρXp1=0.96 (prem. wine),    ρXnp1=0.04 (non-prem. wine) 
 
Multi-purpose Grapes  
 
  Total value:      TVXmp = 245 
  Destinations:    ρXdtd=0.26 (domestic fruit)         ρXdte=0.42 (export fruit)  





Premium Wine  
 
  Total value:      TVYp = 2,392 
  Cost Shares:    κp1=0.27 (prem. grapes)    κp2=0.43 (fixed capitals)          
                           κp3=0.30 (other mobile) 
 
Non-premium Wine  
 
  Total value:      TVYnp = 326 
  Cost Shares:     κnp1=0.09 (prem. grapes)     κnp2=0.24 (multi-purpose grapes)          
                            κnp3=0.43 (fixed capitals)     κnp4=0.24 (other mobile) 
 




Premium Wine  
 
Domestic:   producer value before WET (tax):     TVYpd1
 = 718 
                       final wine value after GST:      TVQpd
* = 1,726 
                       cost shares for marketing:     λpd1=0.59 (wine)      
                                                                       λpd2=0.41 (retail marketing inputs)    
       
Export:     producer value:      TVYpe1= 1,674 
                     f.o.b. value:            TVQpe = 1,840 
                     cost shares for marketing:     λpe1=0.91 (wine)      
                                                                    λpe2=0.09 (marketing inputs)  
  
Non-premium Wine  
 
  Domestic:   producer value before WET (tax):     TVYnpd1
 = 280 
                       final wine value after GST:      TVQnpd
* = 652 
                       cost shares for marketing:     λnpd1=0.61 (wine)      
                                                                       λpd2=0.39 (retail marketing inputs)    
       
  Export:     producer/ f.o.b.  value:      TVYnpe= 46 
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Table 1(b): Base equilibrium values for 1996 (in 1999 $US million) 
Grapes 
 
Premium Grapes  
 
  Total value:      TVXp = 272 
  Destinations:    ρXp1=0.86 (prem. wine),    ρXnp1=0.14 (non-prem. wine) 
 
Multi-purpose Grapes  
 
  Total value:      TVXmp = 174 
  Destinations:    ρXdtd=0.21 (domestic fruit)         ρXdte=0.29 (export fruit)  





Premium Wine  
 
  Total value:      TVYp = 870 
  Cost Shares:    κp1=0.27 (prem. grapes)    κp2=0.48 (fixed capitals)          
                           κp3=0.25 (other mobile) 
 
Non-premium Wine  
 
  Total value:      TVYnp = 414 
  Cost Shares:     κnp1=0.09 (prem. grapes)     κnp2=0.21 (multi-purpose grapes)          
                            κnp3=0.47 (fixed capitals)     κnp4=0.23 (other mobile) 
 




Premium Wine  
 
Domestic:    producer value before WST:      TVYpd1= 427 
                    retail value:           TVQpd = 790 
                       cost shares for marketing:     λpd1=0.54 (wine)      
                                                                       λpd2=0.46 (retail marketing inputs)    
       
Export:     producer value:      TVYpe1= 444 
                     f.o.b. value:            TVQpe = 488 
                     cost shares for marketing:     λpe1=0.91 (wine)      
                                                                    λpe2=0.09 (export marketing inputs)  
  
Non-premium Wine  
 
  Domestic:   producer value before WST:     TVYnpd1 = 331 
                        retail value:      TVQnpd = 495 
                       cost shares for marketing:     λnpd1=0.67 (wine)      
                                                                       λpd2=0.33 (retail marketing inputs)    
       




Table 2: Market elasticity values assumed 
 
Grape supply 
   
  Short-Run:          ε(Xp, wp)=0.4           ε(Xmp, wmp)=0.5             ε(Xmp, wp)=-0.2 
 
  Long-Run:          ε(Xp, wp)=0.8           ε(Xmp, wmp)=1.0             ε(Xmp, wp)=-0.6 
 
 
Other wine-making input supply 
  
Short-Run:   
                 Premium:            ε(Xp2, wp2)=0.4         ε(Xp3, wp3)=5 
               Non-Premium:      ε(Xnp3, wnp3)=0.5         ε(Xp3, wp3)=5 
 
Long-Run:   
                 Premium:            ε(Xp2, wp2)=0.8         ε(Xp3, wp3)=5 
               Non-Premium:      ε(Xnp3, wnp3)=1.0         ε(Xp3, wp3)=5 
 
Table grape demand 
 
        η(Xdtd, wdtd) = -0.6 ,     η(Xdte, wdte) = -5, 
 
Input substitution for winemaking  
 
Premium:               σ(Xpi, Xpj) = 0.1  (i, j = 1, 2 and 3; i<j) 
Non-Premium:      σ(Xnpi, Xnpj) = 0.1  (i, j = 1, 2, 3 and 4; i<j)     
 
Wine marketing input supply  
 
Premium:              ε(Ypd2, vpd2)=2         ε(Ype2, vpe2)=2          
Non-Premium:      ε(Ynpd2, vnpd2)=2 
         
Input substitution for marketing  
 
Premium:               σ(Ypd1, Ypd2) = 0.1       σ(Ype1, Ype2) = 0.1   
Non-Premium:       σ(Ynpd1, Ynpd2) = 0.1       
 
Final wine demand 
 
Premium:             η(Qpd, ppd) = -0.8     η(Qpe, ppe) = -5      
Non-Premium:     η(Qnpd, pnpd) = -0.9       η(Ynpe, vnpe) = -7.0 





Table 3: Total economic welfare changes (in 2001 AUD million), shares of total 
welfare changes (in %) to various groups, and tax revenue changes (in 2001 AUD 









































     
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆PSXp2+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆PSXnp3  
Wineries Subtotal 
 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆PSXp3+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆PSXnp4  





Marketing Sector  
Subtotal 
 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆CSXdtd 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆CSQpd 




∆ ∆ ∆ ∆CSXdte 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆CSQpe 






Total, AUD million 
2005      1996 
 
42.4        40.5 
 
1.2          2.8 
 
 




35.2         32.9 
 
 
0.9           2.9 
 
 
36.1         35.8 
 
 
2.5           1.8 
 
0.6           0.9      
0.1           0.2      
1.9           1.5 
 
2.6            2.6 
 
 
-0.3           -0.6 
5.8           7.4 
1.3           2.9 
6.8           9.7 
 
 
-0.5           -0.8 
8.7            7.2 
0.2            0.4 
   
8.4            6.8 
 
100           100 
 
13.8          5.4 
2005      1996 
 
23.5       21.9 
  
0.5          1.1 
 
 




57.0       59.1 
 
 
-0.7        -2.0 
 
 
56.3       57.1 
 
 
2.5         1.9 
 
0.8         1.3 
-0.2        -0.3 
2.0         1.8 
 
2.6         2.8 
 
 
-0.1       -0.2 
6.0         8.4 
-0.4       -0.8 
5.5         7.4 
 
 
-0.2       -0.3 
  9.4       8.3 
-0.1       -0.2 
   
9.1         7.8 
 
100        100 
 
21.0        8.4 
2005       1996 
 
25.2          22.2 
 
0.5            1.0 
 
 




40.1            40.0 
 
 
-0.9            -2.8 
 
 
39.2            37.2 
 
 
2.7            1.9 
 
3.5            5.4 
-0.4          -0.7 
1.8           1.3 
 
4.9           6.0 
 
 
-0.1            -0.2 
20.3           26.4 
0.1             0.3 
20.3           26.5 
 
 
-0.2            -0.3 
7.5             5.6 
-0.1            -0.1 
   
7.2            5.2 
 
100             100 
 
65.7             25.6 
2005       1996 
 
2.5            4.2 
             
-0.2           -0.2 
 
                 




3.7             9.2 
 
 
-1.8           -3.7 
 
 
1.9             5.5 
 
 
-0.1            0.3 
 
12.5           14.1 
-1.5           -1.8 
-1.3           -1.2  
 
 9.7            11.1 
 
 
0.1             0.1 
88.9           79.6 
2.8              4.5 
91.8           84.2 
 
 
0.1              0.1 
-5.9            -5.6 
0.2              0.4 
      
-5.6            -5.1 
 
100             100 
 
32.7           15.8 
2005       1996 
 
48.8         50.8 
         
1.2            2.9 
 
              




77.2           89.1
 
 
-0.5            -1.4
 
 
76.7           87.7
 
 
 5.3              4.5
 
-5.8            -8.6
0.5              0.9 
4.9              5.4 
 
-0.4            -2.3
 
 
-0.3           -0.6 
-48.3         -58.6
-3.0           -6.5 
-51.7         -65.7
 
 
-0.5            -0.8
20.9           23.7
-0.3           -0.8 
     
20.1           22.1
 
100             100
 




 Wholesale sales tax 
 GST 




-0.14       -0.16 
-0.02         




-0.16     -0.20 
-0.04 




4.84            3.9 
2.76 




2.52          1.98 
2.24 




2.20            1.94
0.46 
2.7               1.9 29
Table 4: Total economic welfare changes (in 2001 AUD million), shares of total 
welfare changes (in %) to various groups, and tax revenue changes (in 2001 AUD 








































    ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆PSXp2+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆PSXnp3  
Wineries Subtotal 
 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆PSXp3+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆PSXnp4  





Marketing Sector  
Subtotal 
 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆CSXdtd 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆CSQpd 




∆ ∆ ∆ ∆CSXdte 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆CSQpe 






Total (AUD million) 
2005      1996 
 
32.6        31.6 
 
2.2           4.9 
 




32.1         29.4 
 
 
0.6            1.9 
 
32.7         31.3 
 
 
4.0            2.9 
 
1.1            1.6     
0.1            0.1     
3.0            2.4 
 
4.2            4.1  
 
 
-0.6          -1.0 
9.5           11.8 
 1.7            3.7 
10.6         14.5 
 
 
-0.9          -1.4 
14.4         11.5 
0.2            0.6 
   
13.7         10.7 
 
100          100 
 
14.0         5.4 
2005      1996 
 
22.2       21.1 
 
1.4          2.8 
 




45.0        46.2 
 
 
-0.6        -1.8 
 
44.4        44.4 
 
 
4.1           3.0 
 
1.3          2.2 
-0.3        -0.6 
3.2          2.9 
 
4.2          4.5 
 
 
-0.4        -0.6 
9.9         13.6 
-0.6        -1.3 
8.9         11.7 
 
 
-0.6        -0.8 
15.5       13.6 
-0.1        -0.3 
   
14.8       12.5 
 
100        100 
 
21.2        8.4 
2005       1996 
 
21.5           19.3 
 
1.3              2.4 
 




33.1            32.4 
 
 
-0.7            -2.2 
 
32.4            30.2 
 
 
4.0             2.7 
 
3.8             6.0 
-0.5           -0.9 
2.9             2.2 
 
6.2            7.3 
 
 
-0.3           -0.5 
23.3           30.2 
-0.2           -0.2 
22.8           29.5 
 
 
-0.5           -0.7 
12.4           9.5 
-0.1            -0.2 
   
11.8            8.6 
 
100             100 
 
66.4            25.7 
2005       1996 
 
2.6            3.4 
              
-0.003       -0.3 
                 




4.4              7.3 
 
 
-0.9             -3.9 
 
3.5               3.4 
 
 
0.4               0.1 
 
12.2            14.4 
-1.3             -2.3 
-0.9             -1.0 
 
 10.0         11.1 
 
 
0.001         0.1 
85.1           83.3 
2.5             3.3 
87.6          86.7 
 
 
0.001         0.1 
-4.2            -4.9 
0.1             0.4 
      
-4.1           -4.4 
 
100            100 
 
34.0           15.3 
2005       1996 
 
41.2          44.2 
         
2.6            6.2 
              




63.0         72.0 
 
 
-0.4          -1.5 
 
62.6          70.5 
 
 
7.7             6.5 
 
-5.0            -7.2
0.4             0.6 
6.8             7.2 
 
2.2             0.6 
 
 
-0.7           -1.3 
-41.2         -49.8
-3.0           -6.6 
-44.9         -57.7
 
 
-1.1           -1.8 
30.0          32.4 
-0.3          -0.9 
     
28.6          29.7 
 
100            100 
 
32.4            9.9 
Tax revenue 
changes 
(AUD million)  
 Wholesale sales tax 
 GST 




-0.22       -0.24 
-0.04 




-0.26     -0.32 
-0.06 




 4.58           3.66 
 2.70 




2.62           1.76 
2.28 




1.94           1.68
0.42 
2.5              1.7 
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Table 5: Changes in economic welfare to various groups and in tax revenue (in 
2001 AUD million) from premium grape R&D and premium wine promotion 
abroad: 2005 vs 1996 – long run 
 
                                           Premium grape                    Premium wine promotion  
                                        cost-reducing R&D           abroad  
 
 
2005 1996 2005 1996
Global total  13.7 5.2 34.9  11.6
   of which   
Overseas consumers  1.9 0.6 9.3  2.9
Australian total  11.8 4.6 25.6  8.7
  of which  
Tax office  -0.3 -0.2 2.5  1.7
Domestic consumers 
        




         Premium 














         




Source: Estimates in first and final set of columns of Table 4.  31
Figure 1: Real expenditure on grape and wine research and development, 1956-57 to 
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It is informative to compare the above wine industry study with a similar study for the 
beef industry in Zhao (1999) and Zhao, Griffith and Mullen (2001), since those 
industries share a number of common. Both industries export a significant share of 
their output (around 50% for wine and 60% for beef), and both have quality 
differentiated products (grain-fed and grass-fed beef, and premium and non-premium 
wine). In each case products are quality differentiated early in the production chain. 
 
There are also the following differences between the two industries and the 
assumptions used in the two studies. First, all four products in the beef study, whether 
grain- or grass-fed and whether destined for the export or domestic market, are 
processed through a joint processing sector at the abattoirs, which is captured in the 
study by a joint production function. Marketing sectors are separate for export and 
domestic destinations but joint for each quality of grain- and grass-fed beef. The 
wineries, on the other hand, are more closely linked with the farm sector and thus the 
post-farm processing and marketing are separated by qualities and destinations.  
 
Second, export and domestic beef are differentiated products early on in the 
production chain, unlike for wine where premium wine for both export and domestic 
consumption are assumed to be of the same quality up to the point of cellar door (Yp). 
 
And third, supply in the post-farm sectors for beef (feedlots, abattoirs, retailers, etc.) 
is assumed to be highly elastic (ε=5), while in the wine model some winery inputs are 
assumed to be specialised and so inelastic in supply (ε=0.4 to 1.0 for human and fixed 
capital and ε=5 for labour, etc.). Marketers also are assumed to be less elastically 
supplied to the wine industry than that for beef (ε=2 for wine compared with 5 for 
beef). 
 
The differences in the distribution of welfare results for the two industries (based on 
the 2005 results for wine) are summarised in the Table A.1. Due particularly to the 
difference explained in point (3) above, post-farm sectors in the beef industries are 
unable to benefit greatly, leaving the welfare gains from R&D or promotion accruing 
to either farmers or consumers. In contrast, due to the assumed inelastic supply for 
wine-specific inputs, wineries are able to collect sizeable welfare gains from grape 
and wine R&D, and even to gain reasonably from marketing R&D and domestic 
promotion.  
 
Another significant difference in the two sets of results relates to the case of export 
promotion, where domestic consumers gain significantly in the beef case and lose in 
the case of wine. This is due to the differences listed in the above points (2) and (3). 
Premium wine for export and domestic is assumed to be the same product at cellar 
door (Yp). Export promotion shifts the supply of premium wine away from the 
domestic market, so the premium price for domestic sales increases, leaving domestic 
consumers worse off (with a lower quantity and higher price). For beef, export and 
domestic products are differentiated all the way back in the production chain (made 
possible via contracts through vertical integration, as exported beef has unique genetic 
and nutritional specifications even before feedlot entry, so they are then linked with   34
joint production functions in processing and marketing). Due to this assumption of 
jointness, an increase in demand for one product will result in an increased supply of 
the joint inputs and thus increased supply of other products. As a result of an overall 
supply expansion, domestic consumers enjoy a price fall, and thus a gain in welfare.   
 
 
Table A.1: Comparison of welfare shares (%) from R&D and promotion for 
Australia’s beef and wine industries 
  Farmers  Processors+Marketers 
(beef: feedlot+abattoir+ retailer 
wine: wineries+retailers+others) 
     Consumer 
Domestic  Export 
Farm R&D: 
   Beef 








  51             8 
  7/11         8/14 
Processing R&D: 
  Beef 








   55           9 
   6/9          9/15 
Domestic Prom’n:
  Beef 








   62           6 
   92/88      -6/-4 
Export Prom’n: 
  Beef 








  50            9 
 -52/-45     20/29 
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